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TOWARDS LONGER TIME HORIZONS
IN PERSONAL TAXATION*
By

DAVID SEWELL**

I. INTRODUCTION
Carter's influence on tax policy was immense.1 Surely no
other official report on taxation has been so widely cited or
influential.
I would like to cite a recent example of Carter's influence in
this respect. In an excellent book on recent United States tax
reform put out by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the Nobel
Laureate James Tobin commented with regret on the short time
period and what he saw as the resulting lack of preparation leading
up to the U.S. reform. According to Tobin, what the United States
really needed was "a bipartisan or nonpartisan blue ribbon
to study the
commission, like the Canadian Carter Commission ...

and prepare the intellectual and political ground for
whole system
2
reforms."
* Copyright, 1988, David Sewell.
**Director of the Tax Measures Evaluation Division, Government of Canada. Previously
Research Director for the Economic Council of Canada's Study The Taxation of Savings and
Investment. The findings of the paper are the responsibility of the author and, as such, have
not been endorsed by his current or previous employers.
'Canada, Royal Commission Taxation, Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) (Chair.
K. LeM. Carter) [hereinafter Report; in the text of this article, the Commission and its Report

are often referred to by their popular name, simply "Cartel.
2

Economic Consequences of Tax Simplification (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,

1985) at 183.
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I want to pay the Carter Commission another compliment,
although in this case a rather backhanded one. As one who has
recently been working on Canadian tax reform, I can attest to the
fact that the public firmly believes in income (as opposed to other)
taxes, and I attribute a large part of this belief to the influence of
Carter. Indeed, I think this belief in an income tax is so closely held
to the breast of the Canadian taxpayer that those advocating a
different tax base are dead in the water unless they are careful
about what they call it. Those who advocate consumption taxes or
taxes that are closer to a consumption tax base, for instance, had
better call their approach either cash-flow income taxes, taxes on
consumed income, lifetime income taxes, business transfer taxes, or
- if all else fails - pension reform, to even be taken seriously in the

public debate.
The preferred tax base of Carter was annual income. In my
paper - and with respect - I want to examine the case for adopting

different bases for personal taxation that have longer time horizons.
The distinguishing feature of these alternative tax bases is their
treatment of savings.
An annual income tax taxes both consumption and saving.
An income tax that allows deduction of saving, however, is taxing
either consumption or lifetime income. This is exactly the function
of Registered Pension Plans and Registered Retirement Savings
Plans in our present personal tax system. The taxpayer is allowed
to reduce taxable income by contributions to these plans but must
declare withdrawals from these plans as taxable income. All balances
remaining in Registered Retirement Savings Plans at death are
taxable.
If there were no limits on the tax-deductible amounts that
could be contributed to RPPs, RRSPS or similar "registered" savings
plans, an annual income tax would be converted into a cash-flow or
lifetime income tax. If funds for making gifts or bequests could be
withdrawn from registered savings without the donor paying taxes,
we would then have a consumption tax in the form of a tax on
consumed income.
The other method of not taxing savings in direct personal
taxation is to allow no deduction when assets are acquired but also
to exempt from taxation all income from the assets. Because this
method pushes tax payments on income forward, in contrast to cash-
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flow taxation, we shall follow the U.S. Treasury document Blueprints
for Tax Reform in calling it the prepaid consumption tax approach. 3
This is, in fact, exactly how we do treat investment income from 30
percent of the physical wealth of Canadian households, in owneroccupied housing.4 Those investing in owner-occupied housing are
not allowed to deduct the costs of such investments from taxable
income. Equally, they are not taxed on the yield of this investment
- either in the form of the imputed rental value of such housing or
any capital gains when the asset is sold.
While the tax burden resulting from cash-flow and prepaid
consumption taxes would appear to be analytically equivalent, there
are important differences in the economic effects of these methods
of not taxing savings.
I intend to discuss only direct personal taxation in my paper.
Others at this Conference are discussing the role of corporate
taxation. One can also implement a consumption tax by means of
indirect taxes such as broad-based sales taxes which do not take
account of the taxpayer's individual circumstances. Carter, of course,
could not see any merit in using broad-based indirect taxes for
purposes that can be achieved by direct personal taxation but
opinions still differ on this issue.5

3

Recently reprinted as D.F. Bradford et aL, Blueprintsfor Basic Tax Reform (Arlington,

Va.: Tax Analysts, 1984).
4

For the composition of assets of Canadian households, see J.B. Davies, "On the Size
Distribution of Wealth in Canada" (1979) 25 Rev. Income & Wealth 237 at 242.
5

The Carter Commission asserted that:
Rigid adherence to our equity principles would call for the complete abolition of
all sales taxes....

The Commission went on to add that:
We do not advocate such a course, in part because we think that virtually the same
result could be achieved in a way that would be less disruptive.

The Commission would have kept sales taxes at their existing levels but given income tax
credits to offset their effects. See Report, supra, note 1, vol. 1 at 8.
For more favourable assessments of the role of sales and other indirect taxes relative to

direct taxation, see J.R. Kesselman, "The Canadian BT1, the Tax Mix, and Tax Reform"
Discussion Paper No. 86-42 (Vancouver. Department of Economies, University of British
Columbia, 1986); J.R. Kesselman, 'Role of the Tax Mix in Tax Reform" in J.G. Head, ed.,

Changingthe Tax Mix (Sydney. Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1986) 1.
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I mean to base my arguments for longer time horizons than
income
taxation in personal taxation on the principal criteria
annual
familiar in judgments on any tax system: fairness, efficiency, and
simplicity. The reasons why I think we need a longer time horizon
for personal taxation are a mixture of the old and the new.
The argument that it is fairer to adopt a longer time horizon
goes back to Hobbes and John Stuart Mill, 6 although the argument
is strengthened by recent simulations of the burden of taxation under
alternative tax bases.
The case with respect to simplicity goes back, I think, to
Irving Fisher, who showed that a personal tax system with a longer7
time horizon than an annual income tax could be put into effect.
In the 1970s, the case for longer time horizons on grounds of
simplicity was reinforced by important contributions by William
Andrews8 and by the U.S. Treasury document, Blueprints for Tax
Reform.
I also mean to survey efficiency arguments for adopting
longer time horizons in personal taxation. In the past twenty years
the conditions under which alternative tax bases may be more
efficient than annual income taxation have been rigorously
investigated. Attention has focused on measurement of some of the
critical empirical parameters in the debate and we have developed
the new tool of numerical general-equilibrium analysis to work
through the efficiency effects of alternative bases. I mean to report
on some of the implications of this work for the Canadian
economy.

6

For the development of economic thought on the role of income and consumption taxes
as appropriate bases for taxation, see N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1955); RA Musgrave, "The Nature of Horizontal Equity and the Principle of
Broad-Based Taxation: A Friendly Critique" in J.G. Head, ed., Taxation Issues of the 1980s

(Melbourne: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1983) 21 at 22-23.
7 Musgrave, ibid at 22-23.
8

W.D. Andrews, "A Consumption-Type or Cash-Flow Personal Income Tax" (1984) 87

Harv. L. Rev. 1113.
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II. FAIRNESS IN THE TAX SYSTEM
A. Goals for Redistribution in the Tax System
In discussing choice of the appropriate tax base, I will have
little to say about goals concerning the redistribution of income
through the tax system.
In fact, I feel that it is not only
presumptuous but grossly improper for economists to trot out value
judgments on the distributional issue as if their views were of more
value than those of any other member of society. It is the role of
the legislature to decide on the desired extent of redistribution
through taxation. I see the appropriate role for economists in
judgments on this issue as being the much more humble one of
gathering information: measuring the incidence of taxation, for
instance.
I would add further that the question of the choice of tax
base is separate from the issue of the incidence of taxation. Indeed,
I think that there is no bigger problem hampering discussion of the
choice of tax base than that of associating some bases with supposed
redistributional effects. The conventional wisdom is, for instance,
that consumption taxes are regressive. The reality is that if one has
a tax on consumed income, the incidence of taxation can be decided
separately through the rate structure. I also agree with Feldstein's
judgment that, as between the choice of tax base and the incidence
of the base, the former is the logically prior issue.9 The way I like
to put this argument is that we should see whether we can choose
the tax base that maximizes the social pie before we decide which
way to slice the pie.
These remarks may make redistribution sound like an easy
matter. We all know, of course, that there is no more divisive social
issue. Taking a public-choice perspective, I also believe that our
existing incidence of taxation is no accident and is, in fact, the result
of some kind of social consensus, so that changing it presents
problems.

9

M. Feldstein, mhe Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation" (1978) 86 J. Pol. Econ.
S29 at S38.
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This does not mean to say that the economist cannot point
out assumptions about redistribution in the tax reform debate that
are logically inconsistent - and in advocating a personal tax base
with a longer time horizon than annual income taxation, I will be
pointing out a few such problems in an annual income tax base.
B. Horizontal Equity
In a symposium on the influence of Carter, it is appropriate
that one commence any debate on the merits of annual income
taxation and longer time horizons for personal taxation with a
discussion of the extent to which people in equal positions are
treated equally under the alternative tax bases. This goal of treating
likes alike - often referred to as the goal of horizontal equity - was

the principal goal of the Carter Commission.10
One of the traditional objections to an annual income tax,
however, is that it does not treat equals equally because it "doubletaxes" savings. One is taxed first on annual income, and then savings
out of after-tax income re-enters the tax base to be taxed again in
subsequent time periods. This tax treatment favours present over
future consumption. The point was made eloquently by a number
of the great classical economists such as Mill, Marshall, Pigou,
Fisher, and others.11 In more recent times, the point has been
elegantly made by Musgrave, Mieszkowski, Bradford, and others in
arguments for a tax on "options for consumption" or an "endowment"
tax.12 Under such taxes, people with the same present value of

10

When faced with these hard choices we have consistently given the greatest weight

to the [horizontal] equity objective.... We are convinced that scrupulous fairness in
taxation must override all other objectives where there is a conflict among
objectives.
Report, supra, note 1, vol. 1 at 4.
" 1 See Musgrave, supra, note 6.
12

See, for instance, RA Musgrave, "ET, OT and SBT' (1976) 6 J. Pub. Econ. 3;
Musgrave, supra, note 6; P. Mieszkowski, 'The Advisability and Feasibility of an Expenditure
Tax System" in H.J. Aaron & M.J. Boskin, eds, The Economics of Toxation (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980) 179; D.F. Bradford, 'The Case for a Personal
Consumption Tax"' in JA. Pechman, ed., What Should Be Taxed. Income or Expenditure
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980) 75.
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resources would pay the same present value of taxes and the tax
system would not interfere with the timing of consumption.
I would therefore like to illustrate the force of this objection
to annual income taxation by means of a table drawn from the
Report of the Carter Commission itself. The table - 16.1 from
volume 2 - was intended to illustrate the advantage in tax
"deferment" from allowing savings to receive "registered" treatment

(as in Registered Pension Plans and Registered Retirement Savings
Plans) compared to "non-registered" treatment.
By the simple manipulation of dividing the totals in registered
savings by non-registered savings one can obtain the additional tax
rate imposed on savings by an annual income tax for any time period
of savings, interest rate and marginal tax rate. This is what I have
done in my second table.
One can generalize the results from this table. The effective
tax rates on savings - over and above those levied on income - rise

dramatically with the interest rate and the tax bracket of the saver.
This tax is not constant irrespective of the savings period, moreover.
Due to the miracle of compound interest, it increases with the time
period of savings.
On the side of horizontal equity, of course, the table
illustrates the fundamental inequity in treatment of those whose
tastes for present and future consumption differ. Those who save
now for future consumption are heavily penalized under an annual
income tax base.
As far as redistribution between income classes is concerned,
I would like to draw attention to some additional consequences
which I would suggest are - to appropriate Henry Simons's felicitous
phrase - "distinctly ... unlovely." Here, I suggest that we focus on

Carter's results for a 7 percent interest rate as representing reality.
The average return on trusteed pension plans has been higher than
this since Carter.
It is immediately evident from the table, of course, that the
high-income taxpayer suffers the most from the double taxation of
savings inherent in an annual income tax. Over a 40-year period,
however, the saver in the lowest tax bracket is catapulted into the
top tax bracket on any amount that he saves. The saver in the
second lowest bracket pays almost double the highest marginal rate
over a 40-year savings period.
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I would find it very difficult to justify these reversals in
redistributional objectives among those who do and do not save. It
is also entirely understandable why Carter wanted to have generous
registered savings plans for those with lower income.
It is less understandable why Carter's sympathies ended with
the low- and middle-income classes. One can understand why
egalitarians such as Kaldor have objected to spending financed by
dissaving from accumulated wealth that goes untaxed. 3 But what is
it about the act of saving that attracts the ire of other egalitarians?
Those who are of the persuasion that we should apply an
extra tax not just to the rich but to rich savers might also consider
another point. The extra tax on saving can be avoided entirely by
appropriate modification of behaviour: the spendthrift does not pay
any additional taxes. If one wanted to be pejorative, in fact, one
might well say that annual income taxation is a system thought up
by or for the prodigal son.
One might ask how much better off the representative
taxpayer would be if we simply removed this distortion in
consumption patterns over time without affecting levels of capital
accumulation in the economy. According to a forthcoming study by
Beach, Boadway, and Bruce, the improvement in lifetime income for
the representative Canadian would be about 1 percent.1 4 As I will
indicate subsequently, the increase in overall welfare would be higher
if we also affect the level of investment, but 1 percent of lifetime
income is not an inconsequential amount. General-equilibrium
simulations suggest that this is about the order of increase in gross
national product (GNP) that one can expect from "base-broadening"
under an annual income tax - in other words by removing the
present egregious variation in effective
tax rates on different types
15
of investment in our economy

13

See supra, note 6.

14

C.M. Beach, R.W.Boadway & N. Bruce, Taxation and Savings in Canada (Ottawa,
Economic Council of Canada, 1988) at Table 9-2.
15

See S.Damus, "Micro-Computer Simulation with a General Equilibrium Model of
Canada" Discussion Paper No. 311 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, August 1988) at
Table 2-3.
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I have noted that Carter argued for increased use of
registered retirement savings plans - at least for low- and middleincome taxpayers. The Commission recognized that fostering selfreliance in retirement was a well-established social goal. As well it
might have: registered treatment of employee contributions to
retirement plans was instituted in 1919 - a mere two years after our
income tax itself was introduced.
But I would suggest that the case for cash-flow personal
taxation is more than "pension reform". Our present RRSP system,
after all, contains no penalty for withdrawals before retirement. It
may be viewed as a simple device for averaging income and spending
over an indeterminate period and accommodating planning for this
purpose in the tax system.
C. The Need for Short-Term Averaging
The need for averaging may indeed be more immediate than
saving for retirement. The case for some form of averaging to allow
for fluctuations in yearly income in the tax system is widely accepted.
Our progressive tax system, for instance, may hit hard income
"bunched" in a particular year. This is one of the cases where strict
adherence to taxation of annual income is difficult to defend and the
problem is usually recognized by proponents of an annual income
tax.

I have asserted that arguments against averaging are difficult
to defend. It does not follow that we therefore have adequate
averaging schemes. One of the consequences of the United States'
recent so-called tax reform, for instance, has been to eliminate
averaging provisions in their personal income tax. According to
of as much as
Joseph Pechman, this could result in "overpayment"
16
period.
five-year
a
in
tax
of
40 percent
What about our own averaging provisions in Canada? At
present we have a forward averaging device which is used by about
one-third of 1 percent of taxpayers on an annual basis. Previous to
this, we had a general averaging which only permitted averaging for
increases and not declines in income.

16
J.A. Pechman, 'Tax Reform: Theory and Practice" Brookings Discussion Papers
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986) at 21.
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What about the need for averaging? My third table draws
on data from Revenue Canada's "green book 17 to show the extent
of the problem in the most recent year for which data were
available. As can be seen on the left hand of the table, roughly 40
percent of taxpayers had incomes that were either stable or falling
in 1983. The average year-to-year change in income for the group
as a whole was a decrease of 25 percent. As one can see from the
right-hand section of the table, the average decline in income did
not vary much by age-group.
Nor do the statistics on fluctuations in income in 1983 appear
to be atypical in our recent history. Inspection of the green book
suggests that average year-to-year reductions in income in the late
1970s and early 1980s were similar to those in 1983.
What are some solutions to this averaging problem? As has
been demonstrated most notably by William Vickrey, but also by
Antal Deutsch and Jim Davies in this country, cumulative lifetime
averaging is possible under an annual income tax.18 Proponents of
annual income taxes have usually rejected the idea of cumulative
lifetime averaging as being visionary and impractical. Opponents of
the idea are vague, however, about the time period over which
averaging should apply under an annual tax.
Carter, as we know, proposed not only "block averaging" for
a five-year period, but also a new measure of self-averaging by
means of an "income adjustment account." This would have worked
like a form of registered saving with the government getting the
benefit of returns on the savings. Deposits into the accounts would
have been tax-deductible, and withdrawals 1 9taxable, but funds
deposited would not have earned any interest.
I have often wondered why the Commission advocated this
new averaging vehicle when a combination of registered and "tax
prepaid" savings accounts can be used for the purpose of self17

Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985).

18
See W. Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation (New York. Ronald Press, 1947); J.B.
Davies, "Does Canada Need Capital Transfer Taxation" in W.R. Thirsk & J. Whalley, eds, Ta
Policy Option in the 1980s, Canadian Tax Paper No. 66 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,

1982) 337; A. Deutsch, "On the Taxation of Life Income" (1975) 3 Pub. Fin. Q. 299.
19 Supra, note 1, vol. 3 at c. 13.
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averaging to minimize adverse tax consequences of short-term
fluctuations in income? The explanation, I think, lies in the belief
of the Carter Commission that registered savings were only to be
used for the purpose of providing savings for retirement.
D. RedistributionalEffects of Alternative Tax Bases
What would be the effects on the distribution of income of
moving to a longer measurement period for personal taxation than
annual income taxation?
Here, I think it is proper to note a major empirical advance
since Carter. Accompanying an interest in longer time horizons for
personal taxation have been serious attempts to estimate incidence
effects over lifetimes. I am referring, for instance, to the pioneering
work by Davies, St-Hilaire, and Whalley in developing2 1a microsimulation model of lifetime distribution and tax burdens.
At the time of Carter all calculations of the incidence of
taxes used annual data on the distribution of income, and
unfortunately the practice is still prevalent. It is well known,
however, that inequalities in income and some of its components
which are important in incidence studies are much more marked in
annual data than in data for longer time periods. For instance, the
relative income, savings and consumption of individuals depend on
their age or position in their life cycle. Because of these life-cycle
effects, annual income distributions give a distorted picture of those
in low- and high-income groups. For example, examination of
Statistics Canada's family expenditure surveys shows that the average
age of the family head falls from around 60 in the lowest annual
income decile to around 45 in the highest decile. 22 Moreover,
annual data reflect "transitory" changes in the earnings and wealth
of individuals which by definition are not a good indication of their
20

Indeed, a central argument of Blueprints for Tax Refonn, supra, note 3 is that use of
both cash-flow and prepaid consumption taxes is necessary in a lifetime wealth or consumption
tax base to minimize lifetime tax burdens and avoid averaging schemes.
21

See J.B. Davies, F. St-Hilaire, & . Whalley, "Some Calculations of Lifetime Tax

Incidence" (1984) 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 633.
22

See J.B. Davies, "Manufacturers' Sales Tax, Value-Added Tax, and Effective Tax

Incidence" in Proceedings ofthe Thirty-Seventh Tax Conference -1985 (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1985) 15:1 at 15:7.
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long-run status. We have already seen in our discussion of the need
for short-term averaging that such transitory changes can be
substantial.
An annual income distribution thus catches people in a
"snapshot" or "freeze-frame" view which is not necessarily typical of
their longer-run experience. For example, it has been shown that
half of the inequality in annual earnings disappears when one looks
at lifetime earningsY
In his Innes address to the Canadian Economic Association
in 1984, John Whalley's conclusion from an evaluation of these
incidence calculations based on annual income data was that they
chiefly reveal the amount of implicit theorizing about the incidence
of taxes. Whalley went on to say that using annual income data,
"the tax system can appear as sharply progressive or regressive"
24
depending upon the assumptions one makes about shifting of taxes.
This sensitivity to shifting assumptions largely disappears in
lifetime simulations of the incidence of taxation. 25 Additional work
has also shown that there is not much difference in the estimated
lifetime incidence of annual income taxes and alternative tax bases
with longer time horizons. In Table 4, I have reproduced some
results from a recent study by Davies and St-Hilaire. Using existing
tax rates, the table shows the lifetime incidence of annual income
taxes; of "prepaid" consumption taxes; and of cash-flow personal
taxes where unlimited use of registered savings plans is possible.
The results suggest that progressivity would indeed be
affected only slightly by a move from annual income taxes to either
alternative tax system, given the lifetime incidence under the current
personal tax system. The overall incidence of personal taxation
would be slightly more progressive with a cash-flow tax system than
it is under the current personal annual income tax and slightly more
regressive under a tax-prepaid system.

23J. Mincer, Schooling Eqierience andEarnings (New York. Columbia University Press,
1974) at 119.
24

j. Whalley, "Regression or Progression: The Taxing Question of Incidence Analysis'

(1984) 17 Can. J. Econ. 654.
25

See Davies, St-Hilaire & Whalley, supra, note 21 at 633.
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Im. EFFICIENCY
Would we be better off if we adopted a tax system which was
neutral between present and future consumption? Let me dispose
of a red herring before I attempt to answer this question. It is often
asked why Canadians need to save more, when we already save more
than foreigners.
It is time that we disabused ourselves of this myth that we
Canadians are among the world's great savers. I regret to say that
the Carter Commission may have contributed to the formation of
this myth.26 The origin of the myth probably lies in simple twocountry comparisons with the United States. When one looks at all
of the OECD countries for which one can get data over a 25-year
period, Canada ranks 17th out of 23 countries in terms of its gross
savings rate out of gross domestic product. The results of this
comparison are indicated in Table 5.
International comparisons such as these are basically
irrelevant, however, in determining whether we save too much or too
little. A country's saving rate is determined by a host of factors including income levels, rates of growth of population and
productivity, the age structure of the population and the tax and
social security systems - that vary substantially across countries.
What about the economic case for saying that a tax system
that is neutral toward consumption and saving decisions will yield
increases in output and welfare? Earlier I noted that recent work
by Beach, Boadway, and Bruce suggests that the representative
individual would be roughly one percent better off if we went to a
tax system that was neutral between present and future consumption.
These calculations were "partial equilibrium" in nature: they assume
that there would be no increase in capital accumulation as a result
of changing the tax system. If any increases in capital accumulation
also occurred there would be benefits to society at large as well as
to the individual saver.
26

According to the Commission, "Canadians save a high proportion of their national
income relative to other countries." Report, supra, note 1, vol. 2 at 208. See also ibid vol.
2 at 231; ibid vol. 3 at 413.
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On the other hand, the theoretical debate on income and
consumption taxes has shown that there are reasons why we may not
want to be neutral with respect to consumption now and in the
future, and why we may want to tax savings.2 7 For instance, annual
income, cash-flow, and consumption taxes have another important
consequence that has to be taken into account in assessing their
relative merits: their effect on labour supply. The importance of
the labour-supply effect is captured in the old saying that "they can't
tax leisure". Annual income, cash-flow, and consumption taxes all
reduce work effort, since leisure can be chosen as an alternative.
Cash-flow and consumption taxes will have greater effects on labour
supply than an annual income tax, however, because to raise the
same amount of revenue, cash-flow and consumption tax rates have
to be higher -in the short run than annual income tax rates. (This
follows from the fact that income is greater than consumption.)
It is therefore evident that the debate over annual income,
cash-flow and consumption taxes cannot be settled on theoretical
grounds. The debate in fact turns on the empirical questions of the
responsiveness of savings and labour supply to changes in tax rates.
Turning to the first question, would Canadians increase their
savings substantially if we removed disincentives to saving in our tax
system? At the time of Carter, it was widely thought that saving was
completely unresponsive to changes in its rate of return. As
economists know, however, the size of savings elasticities has been
a hotly debated topic in recent years. The recent study by Beach,
Boadway, and Bruce contributes some new evidence on this subject
for Canada. As can be seen from Table 6, this work reveals
substantial responsiveness of savings to changes in its price although the effect varies markedly with the age of the saver.
Given this indication that the amount of saving would indeed
be responsive to changes in its price, would removing tax
disincentives to saving increase investment? There would be little
doubt about the sequence of events in a closed economy. An
increase in savings would lead to reductions in interest rates,
increases in investment, and higher output because the productivity
27

See WJ. Corlett & D.C. Hague, "Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation"

(1953) 21 Rev. Econ. Stud. 21; M.A. King, "Savings and Taxation" in G.A. Hughes & G.M.
Heal, eds Public Policy and the Tax System (London:

George Allen and Unwin, 1980) 1.
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of labour is increased. In the long run, the economy would attain
a new equilibrium with a higher capital-labour ratio, a lower interest
rate, and a higher wage level.
This "closed economy" case is exactly what was simulated in
some of the early general equilibrium calculations that focused
attention on the debate over income and consumption taxes. I am
referring here to Summers' well-known 1981 paper in which he
found that substituting a cash-flow tax for an annual income tax
would increase the representative individual's2 lifetime income by 12
percent - a huge increase by any standards. 8
In a small open economy such as Canada's, however, one
obviously cannot assume that an increase in savings will feed back
entirely into domestic investment. What happens to the extra saving
depends on the working of the international capital market and tax
provisions affecting income from foreign investment. Additional
saving induced by changing the tax system could directly increase our
capital stock, could replace foreign investment here, or could simply
flow out of the country.
Taking these factors into account, Gauthier has simulated the
long-run effects of annual income taxes, "prepaid" consumption taxes,
and personal cash-flow taxes for Canada. In the most probable
scenarios, he finds that, compared with an annual income tax, the
effect of a cash-flow tax would be an increase of roughly 7 percent
in the representative individual's lifetime income. It is also of
considerable interest that, according to the simulation, wages would
increase by 14 percent under cash-flow taxation, so that
working
29
change.
policy
the
from
most
benefit
Canadians would
What about the effects of tax changes on labour supply in
our welfare calculations? Most international enquiries suggest that
the labour-supply responsiveness of men and single women to tax
changes is slight. Typically, a decline of one percent in the aftertax wage increases the amount of labour supplied by one-tenth of
one percent. The labour supply of married women, however, has

28L.H. Summers, "Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life Cycle Growth Model"
(1981) 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 533.
29

D. Gauthier, 'Taxation and Life Cycle Savings Behaviour in a Small Open Economy"

Discussion Paper 306 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, June 1986).
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shown much greater variability from one study to another. Based
upon the most recent survey of Canadian studies, the labour supply
response of married women would appear to be much in line with
that for men and single women.30 Another recent study by Cloutier
suggests that a reduction of after-tax wages would increase the
labour supply of married women by slightly more than that of men
and single women, but still by only two-tenths of one percent.31
The upshot for our efficiency calculations, using Cloutier's
estimates of the responsiveness of labour supply, is that the entire
efficiency costs of taxes on labour income could well be under one
percent of GNP. Since what matters in contemplating movement
from an annual income tax to longer time horizons for personal
taxation is the additional drop in labour supply, the matter would
not appear to be one for serious concern.
While the results of these enquiries into the responsiveness
of labour supply are reassuring to those who advocate lengthening
the time horizon for personal taxation, my own conclusion is that we
need more information on this score. The labour supply studies that
I have cited tell us what would happen to labour supply in the short
run if we change after-tax wages. In contemplating the choice
between annual income taxation and alternative tax bases, we would
also like to know the effect of changes in after-tax wages on longrun labour supply. We do not have this information at present and
to that extent I think we have to qualify our finding that lengthening
the time horizon for personal taxation would increase efficiency in
our economy.

30

See L. Osberg, "Behavioural Response in the Context of Socio-Economic Microanalytic

Simulation," a report to the Social and Economic Studies Division, Statistics Canada, April
1986, 93 pages, mimeo.
31

E. Cloutier, 'Taxes and the Labour Supply of Married Women in Canada" Economic

Council of Canada, Discussion Paper 305, Ottawa, May 1986. The estimated labour-supply
responsiveness of married women in some U.S. studies has been significantly higher, however,
the most recent U.S. study, which criticizes the methodological shortcomings of previous

estimates, arrives at conclusions very similar to current Canadian work. See T.A. Mroz, 'The
Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women's Hours of Work to Economic and
Statistical Assumptions" (1987) 55 Econometrica 765.
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IV. SIMPLICITY
In current discussion of tax reform, much is made of the

need for simplicity. It is quite evident that this is one area where
an annual income tax is absolutely inferior to proposals which make
use of longer time horizons for personal taxation.
In fact, annual income taxation is nothing but a pipe-dream,
if interpreted literally. Most obviously, true annual income taxation
would require accrual accounting of capital gains on an annual basis.
One wonders whether anyone regards this as a practical (let alone
desirable) possibility. Under either prepaid consumption taxes or
cash-flow personal taxes, one avoids this problem of accrual taxation
entirely.
Annual income taxation also surely requires taxing imputed
income from owner-occupied housing. This problem is avoided by
our present prepaid consumption-tax treatment of housing.
A true annual income tax also requires inflation accounting
for capital income. One might presume that indexation of capital
income is difficult, because it has only been tried in economies
enduring hyperinflation. There is no need to worry about inflation
accounting with either prepaid consumption taxes or cash-flow
personal taxation, of course.
Presumably, if one wanted an annual income tax one would
also have to get rid of registered pension plans and registered
retirement savings plans and think of some means of taxing the $190
billion of assets presently in these plans. I leave the practicality of
this suggestion to the reader's appraisal.
When one considers this list of problems, one is forced to
realize that the principal financial assets of Canadians do not now
get annual tax treatment. The principal assets of the average family
are owner-occupied housing and rights to pension plans. As we
have noted above, owner-occupied housing alone constitutes around
one-third of physical assets of the average Canadian household.
Nor are financial assets all that matter. Estimates of the
proportion of human to total capital in economies such as ours
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range as high as 96 percent.3 2 It is worth noting that human capital
33
gets treatment comparable to registered savings in our tax system.
By the economist's market test of what people choose,
therefore, one might claim that we have rejected an annual income
tax for our principal assets.
What about the practicality of expanding the time horizon in
our personal tax system? Expansion of registered savings plans is,
of course, no problem and the federal government is planning to
expand RRSP limits at the time of writing. Expanding prepaid
consumption taxes is equally feasible - one simply raises the present
$1,000 exemption for interest and dividends. One might like to
introduce registered borrowing to complement registered saving some experts think this would be necessary to enable planning over
a lifetime and complement registered saving. Under such a scheme,
one would add the amount borrowed to income in the year
borrowed and deduct costs of borrowing in the years of repayment.
While this idea might strike some as novel, this is exactly how we
treat borrowing in excess of the adjusted cost of insurance policies
at present in our tax system.
In aggregate then, there is really nothing that is infeasible or
particularly difficult about extending the time horizon for personal
taxation. It seems to me to be a simple evolutionary process that
would build on important steps taken in the past in the development
of our personal tax system.

32

See D.W.Jorgenson & A. Pachon, "The Accumulation of Human and Non-Human

Capital" in F. Modigliani & R. Hemmings, eds, The Determinants of National Savings and
Wealth, Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association at
Bergamo, Italy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) 302 at Table 15.2.
33

For the equivalence of present tax treatment of "human capital" and registered savings

plans, see Davies & St-Hilaire, Reforming Capital Income Taxation in Canada (Ottawa,

Economic Council of Canada, 1987) at 14.

1988]

Time Horizons in Personal Taxation
APPENDIX I
Table 1
Net Annual After-Tax Retirement Income for 15 Years
To Be Derived from Retirement Savings

(%)

Annual After-Tax Retirement Income for
Each $1000 of Annual Before-Tax Income
From 20 Years of
From 40 Years of
Savings With
Savings With
Investment Yield of:
Investment Yield of:
5%
7%
5%
7%

20 NRa

2,145

2,820

6,840

11,245

Rb

2,550

3,600

9,310

17,535

30 NR

1,720

2,190

5,140

7,905

R

2,230

3,150

8,145

15,345

40 NR

1,350

1,565

3,790

5,135

R

1,910

2,700

6,985

13,150

50 NR

1,030

1,230

2,720

3,670

1,595

2,250

5,820

10,960

Marginal Tax
Rate Before
and After
Retirement

aNR - Non-registered savings plan: The annual contribution is not deductible because the plan is not
registered, and therefore the amount saved would be the balance after the applicable tax liability had
been paid. The tax on the investment income is deducted each year and the benefits are not taxable when
received.
bR - Registered plan: The annual contribution is deductible for tax purposes, so the full amount of
income available is paid into the retirement income plan. The investment income is exempt from tax
when earned. Benefits are taxable when received.
Source: Report, vol. 3, Table 16-1 at 410.
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Table 2
Effective Additional Tax Rate
On Savings For Future Consumption
Implied by an Annual Income Tax

From 40 Years of
Savings with Tax
Investment Yield of:
7%
5%

(%)

From 20 Years of
Savings With
Investment Yield of:
7%
5%

20

19

28

36

Marginal
Rate

56

30

30

44

58

94

40.

42

73

84

156

50

55

83

114

199

Source: Report, Vol. 3, Table 16-1 at 410.

APPENDIX III
Table 3
Income Instability, by Age Group,
Canada, 1983
Average Income Decline (%)

Percentage of Taxpayers
whose income declined
or stayed the same

Under 20 iuili......iuili

mmmmmmmmmmlmmmmmmmmu
imnmimmmmmlmmmmmmmmm.

20 to 24

.illlliuuu..lli

25 to 29

uill.lillli..

30 to 34

iililuuUluu.

35 to 39

mmimmmmmni.Umiimmmimm

40 to 44

mmmmmmmmmmummmmmmmmmm

45 to 49

mmmmmmmmmmu.mmmmmmmmmm

50 to 54

mmiU
UmmmmmmmmmmU UUmiiimm U

55 to 59

nmmiumi.illlu

mmmmmmmmmmmm.
mmmmmmmmmmmmm
mmmmmmmmmmmmm

60 to 64
65 to 69
70 Plus

0

10

20

30

40

50

0

10

20

30

Source: Based on data from Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1985).
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APPENDIX IV
Table 4
Lifetime Incidence of Alternative Personal Taxes with
Existing Tax Rates: Burden as a Proportion of
Lifetime Income, Canada, 1970
Cashflow
tax (%)

Current personal
annual income
tax (%)

Tax-prepaid
system

1

7.3

7.5

7.4

2

11.3

11.4

10.6

3

12.5

12.8

12.2

4

13.5

13.7

12.7

5

14.5

14.6

14.1

6

15.1

15.4

14.3

7

15.7

15.9

15.8

8

16.7

16.6

16.8

9

17.7

17.9

18.5

10

20.5

19.8

21.0

All

15.8

15.8

15.8

Lifetimeincome
decile

(%)

Source: J.B. Davies & F. St-Hilaire, Reforming Capital Income Taxation in Canada: Efficiency and
DistributionalEffects of Alternative Options (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1987), Table 7-5.

256

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

26

APPENDIX V
Table 5
Average Gross Saving and Gross Investment as a
Proportion of Gross Domestic Product,
OECD Countries, 1 1960-85

Proportion of GDP
Savings Investment

(%)
Japan

33.6

Switzerland
Norway
Austria
Finland
Netherlands
Germany
Portugal

24.1

Australia

24.1

Iceland

23.5

26.7

GDP per
capita, 2
1985
(Canada= 100)

Average annual
rate of growth
of real GDP
per capita,
1960-85

(%)

33.6

80.7

5.7

29.5

27.8

104.1

1.8

27.3

29.3

102.4

3.6

26.9

27.4

64.1

3.4

25.6

27.0

80.9

3.5

24.9

23.7

63.3

2.4

24.7

24.0

75.1

2.7

26.8

14.9

4.2

26.6

72.2

2.4

80.4

3.1

France

23.3

23.7

67.4

3.1

Italy

22.3

21.9

46.0

3.2

Spain

22.3

22.8

31.2

3.7

Greece

22.2

25.1

24.2

4.3

Sweden

21.8

22.5

88.1

2.5

New Zealand

21.6

25.3

49.5

1.5

Canada

21.6

23.3

100.0

3.0

Belgium

21.1

21.3

58.8

3.1

Denmark

20.1

22.8

83.0

2.7

United States

19.2

19.1

121.0

1.9

Ireland

19.2

24.2

37.6

2.9

United Kingdon

18.8

18.9

58.3

1.9

Turkey

17.0

19.2

7.8

3.1

2IListed

indescending order of savings share of GDP; Luxembourg and Yugoslavia have been excluded.
Calculated in U.S. dollars, at 1985 prices and exchange rates.
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, NationalAccounts of the OECD
Countries: 1960-85, vol. 1(Paris: OECD, 1987).
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APPENDIX VI
Table 6
Effect on Saving of a One-Percentage Point Increase
in After-Tax Rate of Return, by Age Group
Age Group
(years)

Change in Saving

Under 25

104.5

25-29

54.1

30-34

24.6

35-39

8.4

(%)

40-44

-0.1

45-49

-3.9

50-54

-5.3

55-59

-5.7

60-64

-6.3

65 and over

-10.0

Overall

39.2

Source: C.M. Beach, R.W. Boadway, and N. Bruce, Taxation andSavings in Canada, (Ottawa: Economic
Council of Canada, 1988), Table 7-8.

